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fHf TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING BITNER CO.
JlrJNILY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH Wt:STCOR,
WIN SUN AND BADGER FOR DAMAGES Tri ROc,ERS.

11

<.;1nce 81tner Co. never dealt directly >1it'1
!·' 'cJers, it could be liable ocily u;:ion a J'Jtnt

\'t-'r:ture theory.
A.

Such a

theur1

WdS

not

proven.

THE FACTS DO NOT SHOW A JOINT VENTLJPf:, OF
INTENT BETWEEN BITNER CO. AND WESTCORMCJNSON AS A MATTER OF LAW.

11

No document or action demonstrates an
intent by Bitner Co. to enter into a
Joint venture >1ith Westcor nr anyone else.
The underlyiny ayreement >1as a uniform real
estate contract het>1een R1tner Co. as seller
of the land and Westcor as the purchaser
that intended to develop the land.
The situation does not meet the ]Dint
venture standards recognized by this Court.
llettenson v. Call Auto Equipment Sales, Tnc.,
645 P. 2d 684 (Utah 1Q82); Bassett v. Baker,
'>30 P. 2d 1 (Utah lg74).
j.

THERF
H1tr1~r

WAS

NO ELEMENT OF

Co.'s rt::'al

es~atr·

12

LOSS.
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l ans.

2.

THERE WAS NO PROFIT SHARING.

13

Bitner Co. was entitled to its sales
price.
Its principal could earn money
in his individual capacity by making
referrals, but these would not inure to
Bitner Co.'s benefit.
3.

BITNER CO. HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE
DEVELOPMENT.

14

All development was the responsibility
of Westcor, and Bitner Co. had no
management or other duties.
4.

BITNER CO. DID NOT CONTROL THE FINANCES.

15

Bitner Co. sold its land and had no
influence (let alone control) over any
funds Westcor might obtain or expenses
it might incur in its development.
5.

THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS DISPROVE ANY
JOINT VENTURE BY INTENT.

15

The underlying documents do not set
forth the elements of JOint venture or
set up circumstances to permit a JOint
venture.
B.

THERE IS NO CONCRETE AVERMENT NOR
SUBSTANTIATED FINDING OF FACT WHICH
WOULD ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND A
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN BITNER CO. AND
WESTCOR-MONSON AS TO ROGERS BY THE
THEORY OF JOINT VENTURE BY ESTOPPEL
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES.
By their testimony, Rogers relied only on
Westcor as its seller and the developer
when Rogers decided to buy lots, build
houses and obtain construction loans in
hopes of selling the houses and lots at a
profit.
Rogers never knew Bitner Co. or
relied on it when it embarked on its
actions.
Union Tank Co. v. Wheat Brothers,
15 Ut. 2d 101, 387 P. 2d 1000 (Utah 1964).

i

i

16

C.

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT INTENDED THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARIES Of THE PURPORTED
TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN BITNER CO.
AND WESTCOR.

23

When Bitner Co. attempted to resolve
Westcor's breach to it, it did not in any
document recognize any obligation to Roger
or create a beneficiary situation for
Rogers.
See Walker Bank and Trust Co. v.
first Seci::lr"lty Corp., 9 Ut. 2d 215, 341
P. 2d 944 (1959),
1.

THE PURPORTED TRUST AGREEMENT WAS VOID
FROM ITS INCEPTION DUE TO FAILURE OF A
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.

23

Since Westcor failed to do anything the
condition subsequent essential to the
trust agreement was never made, making
that agreement a nullity.
2.

EVEN IF THE TRUST AGREEMENT IS NOT NULL
AND VOID, THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE HOLD
HARMLESS CLAUSE COULD NOT EXCULPATE
WESTCOR AND MONSON FROM THEIR OWN
WRONGFUL AND FRAUDULENT ACTS.

25

Even if the trust ageement were not a
nullity, hold harmless clauses cannot
be enforced to cover fraud.
Lamb v.
Bangart, 525 P. 2d 602 (Utah 1974).
3.

EVEN If THE TRUST AGREEMENT WERE VALID
(WHICH BITNER CO. DOES NOT CONCEDE),
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, INTENDED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Of THAT CONTRACT WHO COULD DIRECTLY
ENFORCE THE HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSE OF
THE TRUST AGREEMENT AGAINST BITNER CO.
Even if the trust agreement were valid
and were to construed to cover fraudulent
conduct, the agreement does not make
Rogers an intended beneficiary with an
enforceable claim against Bitner Co.
Rogers is at most an incidental beneficiary.
Schwinghammer v. Alexander,
21 Ut 2d 418, 446 P. 2d 414 (Utah 1968).

iii

27

4.

THE TRUST AGREEMENT AND THE JOINT
VENT~RE THEORY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL THEORY.

27

An action to require improvements to
be made pursuant to an escrow agreement with Summit County does not snow
that Bitner Co. could be held liable
to Rogers for alleged consequential
damages.
ll.

IF, AS THE TRIAL COURT FOUND, ROGERS IS A
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE ESCROW
AGREEMENT, ROGERS' RIGHTS OF ENFORCEMENT
UNDER THAT AGREEMENT ARE ONLY EQUAL TO
THOSE OF SUMMIT COUNTY AND DO NOT EXTEND
TO AN ACTION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

28

The escrow agreement, like any other
agreement, does not confer greater benefits
nn a third party beneficiary than it does
upon the promisee.
Rogers thus cannot
obtain consequential damages not
provided for in the agreement.
Moreover,
Rogers is not in the category of benef 1ciar1es that could have been contemplated by the escrow agreement since Rogers'
improvements were completed at no cost to
itself.
See, Continental Bank and Trust
Company v-:---R.w. Stewart, 4 Ut.2d 228, 291
P.2d 890 (Utah 19551.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING
DAMAGES TO ROGERS.

32

If, despite all the above, Bitner Co.
is held liable to Rogers, Rogers must
calculate damages on the basis of
his own bargain and cannot promote them.
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING BITNER CO.
:tl!NTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANTS
WESTCOR, MONSON AND BADGER TO BENNETT.
T~E

since Bennett had a preexisting loan to Badger
an~ then loaned mr•ney to Westcor so Westcor
•··,utd eventually be able to repay him for
1.. ,th sums, and since Bitner Co. had no part
1n ~1ther transaction, there was no basis
t•'r t ind1n•J Bitner Co. to be a JOlnt venturer
as to Bennett's loans.
The cases and arguments
'incerninc.J ioint venture set forth in Section
IA are inccq.hirated here as to Bennett's claim.
iv

32

~.

THERE WAS NO JOINT VENTURE OF INTENT.

32

Relying on the legal arguments made
with regard to JOlnt venture on the
Rogers claim, Bitner Co. emphasizes
that Bennett had even less basis to
claim a Joint venture than did Rogers.
B.

THERE WAS NO JOINT VENTURE BY ESTOPPEL
TOWARD THIRD PARTIES IN REGARD TO BENNETT.

33

Bennett, a sophisticated businessman,
took care to know the parties to his
transaction and to get their signatures.
He never relied on Bitner Co. in making
his loans and had no knowledge, experience
or reason to rely on Bitner Co.
C.

EVEN IF A FORMAL JOINT VENTURE BASED ON
THE DOCUMENTS COULD RE FOUND, THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE OR FINDING THAT WESTCOR,
MONSON AND BADGER WERE ACTING IN BEHALF
OF SUCH AN ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE WHEN
THEY OBTAINED A LOAN FROM BENNETT.

34

Even if Bitner Co. was involved in any
kind of Joint venture with Westcor,
that joint venture did not deal with
Bennett in obtaining the Bennett loan.
D.

EVEN IF AN ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE
INCLUDING BITNER CO. DID EXIST, THE
ACTIONS OF WESTCOR, MONSON AND
BADGER IN RELATION TO BENNETT WERE,
BY STATUTE, NOT ACTIONS OF THAT
JOINT VENTURE.
Under the Uniform Partnership Law, U.C.A.
§48-l-6(3)a, all of the partners must
authorize an assignment of partnership
assets in trust for creditors.
Bennett
received such an assignment from Westcor,
Monson and Badger:
to comply with the law,
Bennett must admit that he had dealt with
all partners and that Bitner Co. was not
one of them.

v

35

E.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING BENNETT
TO BE A DIRECT THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
UNDER THE TRUST AGREEMENT AMONG BITNER
CO., WESTCOR AND MONSON.

36

Bennett was even more remote from the
trust agreement than was Rogers; his
loans could not be encompassed 1n the
agreement in order to make him into
an intended beneficiary.
Schwinghammer
v. Alexander, supra and the arguments
in Section IC3 above.
F.

EVEN IF BENNETT WERE AN INTENDED THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT
(WHICH HE IS NOT), HE COULD NOT ENFORCE
THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT IS
SPECIFICALLY UNENFORCEABLE BY WESTCOR
OR MONSON AS TO THEIR OBLIGATION TO
BENNETT.

38

As with the Rogers, when a party has
committed fraud (as did Westcor), 1t
cannot by contract place liability
for its fraud upon anyone else.
Bennett's remedy for the fraud of
Westcor, Monson and Badger 1s against
them directly, not by way of a contract
clause whose enforcement would violate
public policy.
Lamb v. Bangart, supra.
G.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF $10,000.00 TO BENNETT,
EVEN IF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
IS UPHELD AS TO THE REST OF BENNETT'S
CLAIM.
Even if Bitner Co. could somehow be
held liable to Bennett despite the
foregoing, Bitner Co., which did not
directly commit fraud, should not be
liable for punitive damages arising
from the direct and specific fraud
of Westcor, Monson and Badger.
Likewise, an award of an attorney's
fee against Bitner Co. 1s inappropriate.

vi

39

·11.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS
FOR A MISTRIAL MADE BY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL
JOHNS. DAVIS WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HE,
AS COllNSt:L, COULD NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT
BITNER CO. AND WESTCOR AND MONSON BECAUSE OF
SERIOUS AND COMPELLING CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
TH~

40

Bitner Co.'s former counsel Johns. Davis
undertook representation of parties whose
interests were in direct and obvious
conflict so that he was unable to represent
each adequately.
Although recognizing the
severe problem, the trial court refused
to remedy the problem on Davis' repeated
motions for mistrial or a new trial.
As
an alternative, the Court should grant
Bitner Co. a new trial on any issues
not resolved in its favor on this appeal.
u.R. Civ. P. Rule 61, Disciplinary Rules
5-102, 5-105.

44
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BRIEF ON

APPEAL OF

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT M.O.

BITNER

CO.

NATUr<.: OF THE CASE

Defendant-appellant appeals from an order and judgment after trial
the Third Judicial

in

District Court for Summit County

(per Wilkinson,

J.)

which awarded damages and other relief to plaintiffs and to cross-claimant on
the theory

that defendant-appellant was a joint venturer with certain other

defendants.
DISPOSITION JN THE LOWER COURT

The
appellant,

trial court found

jointlv

and

severally

three defendants,
liable

and attorney's fees on the grounds,
defendants to provide

to

the

first,

including the defendant-

plaintiffs

for

damages,

costs

that the failure of certain of the

improvements to Jots purchased by the plaintiffs had

harmed the plaintiffs and, second, that the defendants against which the judgment was so rendered were engaged in a joint venture.
court found,

third,

Jn the alternative,

the

that the plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries of

certain agreements between the defendant-appellant and the other defendants
against whom liability was found directly.
The
•!aim had

trial court further found the defendants against whom the cross-

been

filed

jointly and severally

defendants other

than

claimant

of

because

liable to the cross-claimant,

the defendant-appellant

breach

of

contract

and

directly
the

liable

the

to the cross-

defendant-appellant

liable

i'"''tly and severa•Jy on the grounds either that the defendant-appellant was
'' 1

olved in a joint venture with other defendants or that the cross-claimant

;s a third party beneficiary of a hold harmless agreement between the defendant-appellant

and

the

defendants

against

which

the

cross-claimant

had

a
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either-

101nt

stat . Jte,

other

vpnftirt-

ag:--eement

and

defendant-appellant

<.t-rta1n

by

alle~led

loan

the cross-claimant

defendants

law,

entered

that

in

of

1nvolv1ny

because

venture,

not

defendants even

acts

of

1f

rlt->fenr1ant
absenct'

of

or because the acts
·1f

the

alleged

101nt

4.

Find, as a matter of law, that the cross-claimant is not a thi"

party beneficiary of the hold harmless clause in a trust agreement between the
defendant-appellant and the other defendants cross-claimed against;
5.

Find,

as a matter of law and equity,

that the hold harmles<

agreement as among the parties involved in the cross-claim is void as against
public policy on the basis of fraud;
6.

Find, as a matter of law and equity,

that the defendant-appel-

lant may not be held jointly and severally liable for punitive damages granted
because of fraud,

the trial court having specifically found that the defen-

dant-appellant did not participate in the fraud by the other defendants;
7.

Reverse as a matter of law the findings of the trial court that

the defendant-appellant

is

liable

for

damages

to

the cross-claimant,

either

jointly or severally with the other defendants against whom the cross-claim
has been brought.
8.

In the alternative, grant defendant-appellant a new trial on the

cross-claim because of the conflicting interests between

it ;ind other defen-

dants represented by the same counsel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Parties and the Underlying Agreements.
The defendant-appellant M.O.

owner of the real estate which is,
and

called

Park

Ridge

Estates

Bitner Co.

in part,

("Park

("Bitner Co."),

was the

the subject matter of this case

Ridge").

Bitner

Co. 's

principal ;,

Blaine Bitner, who was one of the defendants ("Blaine Bitner").
By early 1978 Bitner Co. had planned and plotted a subdivision ""'
had obtained

preliminary approval

for

Su mm it County.

-4-

its

development of Park

Ridge fro1"

On November 1, 1978, Bitner Co. entered into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract

("Real Est.

Contract" l

(Exhibit ["Ex."] 23P), which,

together with

certain exhibits attached to it, created an agreement with defendant Westcor,
a corporation

in

formation

("Westcor").

Westcor's

"nd vice president was defendant Monson
defendant Richard
little evidence

Johns

111,

concerning

his

was

not

("Monson").

served

actions.

principal

officer,

owner

Westcor's president,

in this action,

The trial court found

and there is
that Monson

acted for Westcor and became its only principal.

It thus treated the two as

alter egos and referred to them interchangeably.

(Findings of Fact and Law

/"Findings"]

Record

["R."]

787

#9)

The record supports the trial court's

determination of identity between Westcor and Monson and their interests.
Under the Real Est. Contract, Bitner Co. agreed to sell Park Ridge
and all
$400,000

rights and obligations of improvement in Park Ridge to Westcor for
and other consideration.

attached to the Real Est. Contract.
visions,

principals

of Bitner

Co.

An

undated supplemental agreement was

(Ex. 23P)

Under the supplementary pro-

and Westcor could earn referral fees for

each purchaser referred by them to Westcor for any of the lots in Park Ridge.
These fees were payable to individuals and not to their respective companies.
The Real Est. Contract provided that Westcor accepted all development responsibility in Park Ridge and was to complete improvements within one
year.

If the development costs incurred by Westcor proved to be less than

anticipated,
selling price.

Bitner Co. would receive an additional sum beyond the $400,000
(Ex. 23P)

Westcor arranged for an escrow agreement in favor of Summit County,
quaranteeing completion of improvements within two years.

Westcor also

obtained Bitner Co.'s signature on that agreement, having informed Bitner Co.
that it must sign the agreement as the selling land owner.

-5-

(Transcript

("Tr."] 220-2)

Westcor then filed the escrow agreement with the County (ti,.

"Escrow Agreement")

(Ex.

24P).

The trial transcript indicates that the bcr,,.

Agreement was extended, but no copy of the extended Escrow Agreement ""'
entered into the record.
Westcor,

through real estate agents,

the principals of Westcor anu

Bitner Co. and otherwise, was able to sell all the lots in Park Ridge within,
few months after the signing of the Real Est. Contract.

All sales agreements

were signed solely by Westcor (as seller), and all contract payments were to
(See,

be made solely to Westcor.

Exs.

31D-36D, 400, 77D-88D)

Westcor never funded the Escrow Agreement with Summit County as
the Real Est. Contract.

However,
required by

(Findings R. 770 #13)

On or near August 29, 1979, Westcor contracted with Bitner Excav•tion Company,

("Excavation Co."), a Utah corporation existing separate! y and

independently • rom Bitner Co., to install certain improvements in Park Ridge.
(Tr. 223)

However, Westcor did not pay Excavation Co. for work done, and when

Westcor made payments by check for materials for the improvements, its checks
failed to clear the bank.

(Tr. 206)

The trial court found that, except for

paying for minimal amounts of materials,
fulfill

its obligation

to install

the

Westcor

never

improvements at Park

made any
Ridge.

effort tn
(Findings

R. 770 # 12)

In the months following the signing of the Real Est. Contract,
Westcor failed

to fulfill

its obligation to make

improvements at Park Ridge.

It also breached the Real Est. Contract by failing to make required payment,
to Bitner Co. (Tr. 221-22) and even told some persons that it was no longer'
part of the Park Ridge development.

Faced with Westcor's breach and event<'·

repudiation of the Real Est. Contract, Bitner Co. attempted to reach some k1r<'
of resolution of its problems with Westcor and to recover the land.
-6-

On June 30, 1980, Bitner Co. and Westcor signed a Trust Agreement
28P l

tEx.

recognizing that Westcor had defaulted on the Real Est. Contract and

returning all rights in the property to Bitner Co.
Hold Harmless Clause from

Bitner Co.

The Agreement contained a

to Westcor,

subject to Westcor's com-

>1lying with certain requirements of the agreement (the "Trust Agreement" and
the "Hold Harmless Clause").
Initial
1979,

construction of the

improvements

to Park

Ridge

began

in

but they were not completed until the summer of 1981, as was required in

an extension of the escrow agreement with Summit County obtained by Bitner Co.
in late 1980.
2.

The Rogers Claim.
On April

18,

1978,

the plaintiffs William Dean Rogers and Patricia

Lee Rogers (collectively "Rogers") purchased two lots in Park Ridge through a
real estate agent representing Westcor.

The agent told Rogers that Westcor

had represented to him that the improvements to Park Ridge would be completed
by fall,

Rogers purchased the lots,

1979.

speculation anc to sell them for profit.
In order
which were fully

to build

the

intending to build two homes on

(Findings, R. 772-74)

homes,

Rogers obtained construction

payable with interest in January,

construct the homes in

late spring,

1979.

1980.

loans

Rogers began to

He alleges that the homes could

have been finished and sold in 1979 if the improvements to Park Ridge had been
.completed

in

1979,

but

the

construction

itself

was

not

completed

in

1979.

11.sJ.)

Rogers further alleged that because the improvements were not comµleted, he was not able to sell the homes and therefore was not able to pay
"'f the construction Joans.

After having obtained a three month extension on

-7-

thf' loans and still not

sold

hav1n~

the

JO year mortgage' 1n or about April,
In
entPrec1

tht' summer of

into

earnest

and

5130,000

the

other

in

mentioned

by

the

September

trial

lo,:ir1<...

(.!_d.)

1980.

agreements

to

of

sell

1980

one

for

in

home

July,

1•

19811

1

(hPreinaft.,

5130,000

Those Agreements are not part of the re<orrl

"EarnPst Money Agr_,,ents.")
art'

Rogers convPrterl tht:-"

Rogers found purchasers for both hnnu--.,

1980,

money

homes,

court in

its Findings of Fact

(Findings

R.

77\1

The Earnest Money Agrrements were subject to the completion of the impro·.,
ments,

which,

according

to Rogers,

were

not

completed

while

the

Agreem .. nts were valid and binding on the prospective buyers,
Rogers alleger1 that by late 1980,

Earnest Moc',
(0.)

he was no longer able tu pd,

fl;e

mortgag<' payments on the two homes and was forced to avoid threatenPrl fore
closure by agreeing to transfer all
dnd

property

\4oney

to the

prospective

amounted

buyers

who had

earlier

signed

the Earne"

Those buvers assumed the mortgages on the homes,

Ayrt>t>ments.

mortgage

rights and obligations he had in the home'

to

and

5105,419,95

the

second

amounted

to

line

5106,689,111,

Rog"" alleged that the difference between these loans assumed by the buve• •
and the appra1Sed value at the time of the assumption of the mortgages by hi·
buyers
tun 1l y.

the measure of

IS

damages

resulting from

Tht' trial court found for

loss of contractural oppor

Rogers on these allegations,

775-76 #JOI

Rogers

also demanded

R1d<Je be qu1<•ted.
in

this

because

appt>al,
the

trial

1 he

but

trial

B1tnpr

court

that

court's

Co.

found

title

to

Judgment

conSJders

that

the

the

lots

t0

quiet

that

cloud on

he

quiet
title

purchased

title

arose

Pa•'

not

chCJl!t>nlw

claim

rele·

is

title

in

from

fra ',,,,

actions by l\estcor and defendant Alonzo Badger I hereinafter "Badger" I.
trial court also found that "l.estcor had taken a number of actions

-8 -

V'fhll

h an11•'

• .wd by Westcor against Rogers by not funding the Esc >w Agreement and
frau:-1

the actions by 1>estcor, Monson and Badger which clouded Rogers'

1r1

(Findings R. 777 #34)
Cros>
Claim.
·-----As
··M•old H.
,ir

'"d

this

of

August

Bennett

debt

is

("Bennett")
unstated,

in

but

the

Westcor's

if

he

is

interest.

completely clear

Fark Ridge or with Bitner Co.
Utah Security Mortgage.

development

A,

The reason
that

the

loan

Badger was the
tnough

the record

of Park

R1dqe and

in other activities

the

(See Findings R. 7lc #41)

Shortly before August
that

record

and cross-claimant

apparently Badger and Monson had agreed to participate

men were engaged in.

nrnnett

defendant

the sum of $81,078.00 plus

1n the defunct company,

. somewhat unclear,
'nc,cther

Badger owerl

1979,

debt had nothing to do v.

.,,,ncipal

on

2,

would

make

2,

a

1979,

Badger contacted Bennett and told

loan to Westcor,

Westco' would assign

him

_nntract receivables from Park Ridge and Badger would ttwn sell the contract
eceovables

to

a

third

party financial

institution.

The proposed assignment

ie•d sale would allow Westcor and Badger to repay the $81,078.r'n Badger owed
•,«

to repay any new loan to be made by BennPtt to Westcor.

''"',e transaction.

bennett agreed tr.

(_1_9. at ##36, 37)

On August

2,

1979,

Bennett made a loan of $50,000.00 to Westcor and

.,ed a promissory note signed personally by Badger and b)
;ent

of

Westcor.

l•'B,

the

amount

(Ex.

already

72D)

The

owed by

note

required

Badger and

the

the

secure payment on the note,

'eCP1vables on Park

"'''n.

t._,,al

$50,000.00

to be paid to Bennett in full on or before November
To

~onson

30,

as vice

amount

of

loaned

tc

1979.

(_l_9. )

Westcor assigned to Bennett contracts

Ridge with a face value of $20P 348.48.

acting as and stating that they were a partnership,
-9 -

represented that

ttw

lOntratt'

or

Horir11·" 1llt·

altrrnd1t.._..,.,

.,.ould

tH·

tht•n ht• rt"'pd1d from

•oulrl

lif'nnf'tt

rt"'Ct"l"dhlt·'

Thrift

-.old

tht>m

tJ\.

tht· pro<t•ed~

( 1>n1p.ir1\.,

un

thu">t'

of

tompdfl\

ct

twhalf

of

~die~.

or,

dTld

o~nt·l1

H1·11111

•t

thr1t

cuntr1):

Bonr1t>V 1111

{fHldllHJ'

K.

11)9.

,'c~

40.

Un

41)

of 1nvt"it1y•t1on dnd ~uh\t•qut~nt
't\t>!ttlor
prOCf't-d~

(or

dl

•h1rh

d1rt·t ti-.·

mont>y

went

d

pd rt

into Pdrk

'It. ht•n

to

the

779

R1cigt· hut

'It. e~tc or,

8ennett

of

R.

contraci1ct~

Monson

µrot.Pt•ds)

•lt2.

did

uµon

8adgt>r

fund\

l:it•nnt_·lt.

ni->dy

to

781 1145d,

(f1ndllHJ' R.
At

the

t1mt'

h,
tht•

t

to

~ere

the

funci

test1f1erl

Uenn+_·tt

macje

tht.'

the note,

did

not

wa~

tht·

l.i1

Utdh State authur1t1t•'-.

somt>"

Tr.

asked

n~rd

ohl1<:_Jd

~estcor ~

11

11,

tt1dt
1

alleged

they

then

money

that

rpmemher how much.

not

and

it

belief,

bt>rrowing

.~~onson

1._untr•c t-. tu H.-nnt•tt tu cOYt:'r tht' Vdlue of

obtain

anci

legal µroceed1nys by

rt:'µresenletl

lt~dst

1nfurmdt1on

r1

ol

11 ..

407)

ass19nmt'nt"

not l

Bennett

those

ass1qnmt>n!•

I

""'t.. rt'

d"'Si<Jnmpnl~

be1ny

macil'

to

Bennt>ll,

at

lt-·d-·

It
found

thdl

'.~on,rH1,

'ft ...... tt.ur

lht• lodn drrdnqt•mt>nl

•f lt>r
both

't'.t~l(or.

"°'''§On

hd1~

Mori~or1

cMH1

Lic)(..i~r

dfld

<lnd

tit•t·n

Hd<1!Jt->r

md(it•,

l-ldl19t"r

mack-

t•vt•n

comrn1tt~·(:

'>llH.t'

hdd

on ...\u~;u ... t

madt_•

furttwr

10

frdud

tht•1r

31,

1979,

ayrt."'L•ment

lo.cm

dS'>!SJnmt·nh

a9a1n~t

ot

lht:>

(:)ennt'tt "
w1lhtn
~1th

contrdcts

}'<

l'-1

ttw.

J ,

l'it· ('onfl1cts of

lntPrest.

Throu9hout the trial 1n the µrest"nt (a~t>

then

,,"I,

"l'o

on

t'ril<;,

1,

de;,

or

and

relating

to

as

tht•

the

because

to

the

Bt>nnt·tt

Davi~

of

C,tat ..

IJtdh

also

Davis

1103 ~.}

relief

for

cJ

membt>r

himself.

(Tr.

issue~

~o~ers

n

rt•µresented

m"trial

d

a pract1c1ng

Rogers.

t)y

't->\1

wt"rt-' all represPnted bv anothPr <Jpfpnc1ant,

Monson

dfHl

H!ain ... B1tnt"r,

IPstif1erl

John S. Ddvis

I~.

at

Tr.

~g_..

trial,

havinq

21

hf>Pn

madt> two motion~ on the recorc1

confl1< ts

among

existen( .... of

a

loan.

500,

(Tr.

Bar.

H1tnt>r Co.,

1oint

himself

and

among

venture

896)

his

Bitner

Co.

other

them

as

replaced

its counsel after the trial court had entered 1ts 1udgment.

TklAL COURT ERRED IN FIND/NC. BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
lllTH IHSTCOR
MONSON AND BADGER FOR DAMAGES TO ROGERS.

TH~

In

order

for

Bitner

Co.

to be

the

trial

court

had

to

se. nallv,

ad
(o.

~'1t·r

tt1e
Ml<!

an

~Jreached

trial

court

obliga:1on

party

benef;ciary

'ri"I
"'• •1.

l ~it·

• ourt

the

a

Royers,

mat:er

of

In

a 1oint

Harmless

Clau'P

damages

against

1ointly

law

to Roge,..s

that

which

an obl19a-

venturP between

Bitner

Rogers was an inten-

in

required bv Summit County.

Rogers

and

finrl1n9 such

in the alternative,

Hold

either

fact

or severdlly

Roger~.

was

to

Bitner

the

Trust

Agreement

On this conclusion,
<o.

for

the

las.es

The trial court erred in all of these findings.

f.-1' ts do not show

I\. "'~l H

a joint ventun-" of
or Monson as a matter of la._-..

This
', ''t

awardecJ

there

or that,

of

.,f the Escrow Agreement

that

liable

as

1ointl

to the detriment of

l'.estcor and Monson,

• • thirc1

find

either

declared

held

Court

1n a numhpr of

Thp

has

staterl

the

essential

intent

bet,.een

Bitner

Co.

elements

for

a 1oint

venture hy

cases

requirements

for

the

relationship ar-e not •·xactly defint:-d,

hut _.s~~t_d~~_elemen~-~-~-~~~_en~l
11

anrl

------ - - ---- --

the

parties

must

combine

their property, money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge. As
a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the
performance of a CX1111mon purpose, a joint proprietary interest in
subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in
the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the cnntrary, a
duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added).

These standards

were reaffirmed in Bettenson v. Call Auto and Eguipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.)rl
684, 686 (Utah 1982).

A number of the elements essential for finding a joint

venture by intent are missing in the present situation.
1.

There was no element of loss.
Bitner Co. entered into the Real Est.

Westcor agreed to pay Bitner Co.
Ridge.

Contract (Ex.

23P) under which

$400,000.00 for title to the land in Park

That $400,000.00 was due and payable whether or not Westcor succeeded

in developing and marketing Park Ridge.
make whatever profit they expected from

Any failure of Westcor or Monson to
their development of Park

Ridge would

not result in a loss of any sort to Bitner Co.
While there were ancilliary agreements to the Real Est. Agre<"ment,
(considered as one agreement in the trial),

none of those agreements placed

any affirmative obligation on Bitner Co., and none of them required Bitner Co.
to share in any losses.

(See Ex. 23P)

Indeed, the subsequent agreements were

designed solely to provide an opportunity for Blaine Bitner and other individuals (not the companies) to obtain finders' fees by assisting Westcor to fino
buyers for the Jots,

since these persons already knew of some prospects.

(Ex.

23P, Tr. 511-15)
The clause in the Real Est. Contract allowing Bitner Co. to share in
any savings on the development of Park Ridge added to the possibility of f,,r
ther income for Bitner Co. but did not create any possibility of loss tc•
Bitner Co.

The clause simply meant that if Westcor were able to save monev

on

the improvements so that the improvements cost less than anticipated, Westcor

-12-

would pay Bitner Co. more money for the land itself.

It was the sole obliga-

tinn of l'.estcor to pay and bear all development costs, all sales costs and all
0 1ner

costs relating to the development of Park Ridge.

(Ex. 23P)

As this Court found in Bassett:
While the agreement to share losses need not necessarily be
stated in specific terms, the agreement must be such as L
permit the courts to infer that the parties intended to share
losses as well as profits.
Bassett, supra,

530 P.2d at 2.

that allows any

inference whatsoever that Bitner Co.

costs of development with Westcor.
forward,
~estcor

There is nothing in the Real Est. Contract
would share losses or

Since Bitner Co. was party to a straight-

uniform Real Est. Contract,

it could sue Westcor for any failure by

to meet the terms of the sale;

Bitner Co.

could obtain damages to

cover its losses or regain the property in order to avoid any loss because of
a failure or default by Westcor.

In the absence of the element of loss, then,

there was no joint venture between Bitner Co.

and Westcor or its principal

.1onson.

1

2.

There was no profit sharing.
Rogers' contention that the price of the land in the sale to Westcor

was based on sharing expected profits from the development of Park Ridge so
that the simple sales agreement should be considered to be sharing of profits
111

the nature of a joint venture ignores the fact that Westcor was obligated

to pay Bitner Co.

the total purchase price for the land no matter what the

f1nanc1al results of the development to Westcor would be.
:

1

r"e to be paid by Westcor was not a sharing of profits.

Thus, the purchase
(Ex. 23P)

During the trial Rogers made great issue of the tax planning aspects
"1

the sale,

with the apparent hope of showing that the sale was illusory and

reflected a mere contribution of assets.
fallacious.

This argument is strained and

The tax planning done by Bitner Co.

-1 3-

is common,

legal and

perfectly legitimate grounds to motivate Bitner Co.

not to proceed with anv

joint venture or other transaction that might have been considered.
was a sale.

Why the sellers chose the form of sale they did is irrelevant tr,

that fact that the choice was made and reduced to writing.
the best evidence of the transaction it memorialized.
3.

The sale

That writing

(Ex. 23P}

Bitner Co. had no control over the development.
Other elements of a joint venture by intent enumerated by this Court

are missing from the relationship between Bitner Co. and Westcor and Monson.
Blaine

Bitner and

Bitner Co.

witness

Roger

Bitner

and Blaine Bitner as an

development of the subdivision and
control.

(Tr.

140,

524-25,

904)

testified

individual

without contradiction that

had no right to control the

that Westcor did intend it to have any
Bitner Co.

derived no control over Park

Ridge from the separate relationship Excavation Co. developed with Westcor as
a subcontractor at Park Ridge.
independent Excavation Co.

Westcor or Monson did hire the separate and
to install improvements at Park

Excavation Co. had no power or control over the project.
verted testimony of Blaine Bitner,
Bitner,

but

It is the uncontro-

president of Excavation Co. and of Roger

who signed the contract on behalf of Excavation Co.

actually engaged in the work,

Ridge,

(Ex.

1020) and was

that Excavation Co. was not hired for the job

nor allowed to begin work upon the site until August 29,

1979.

Excavation Co.

was hired and allowed to work at the site only after reaching a contractural
agreement with Westcor and Monson about what work
form.

Excavation Co.

would per-

(J,s!.}

Thus, the trial court's contention that all improvement was done
Bitner Co.

or persons under contract with it is simply not substantiated

any way by the record.

(Finding R. 717 #13)

-14-

b-.
111

It

is thus clear and uncontroverted on the record that Excavation

r.o. (which is not the same as or an alter ego for Bitner Co.) entered a sepa• ate

understanding with Westcor-Monson to provide certain excavating services

•o• which Excavation Co. was to be paid certain sums by Westcor.

Excaviltion

0114)

Co.'s

purely

contractual

obligations

to

(Tr. 140,

perform

services

cannot be attr.outed to Bitner Co. and do not entangle Bitner Co. into any new
relationship with Westcor or Monson.

The trial court's assumption that the

excavating services performed by an independent company were related to the
sale of property by another company is clearly erroneous.
are not only separate legal entities,

The two companies

but the trial court had no grounds for

looking beynn-i their legal status.
Bitner Co. did not control the finances.

4.

It is also clear from the record and the documents that Bitner Co.
had no control over the finances for the development of Park Ridge.
in

the development were made in the name of Westcor, and all accounts receiv-

able from those sales were payable to Westcor.

Bitner Co. was not a party to

any of those agreements and was not a payee under any of them.
~-

I.

All sales

(See, inter

Exs. 290-360, 400, 770-880)
The relevant documents disprove any joint venture by intent.
The plaintiffs emphasize the fact that Bitner Co. signed the Escrow

Agreement

with

the County,

alleging that Agreement evidences Bitner Co.'s

alleged status as a joint venturer.

The record shows that Westcor made all

c0ntact relevant to the establishment of the Escrow Agreement.

(Tr. 432-33)

In its Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Bitner Co. stated that
the signing

" ••• was

done only

to

"use fee title [to Park Ridge]
time.••

(R.

677;

see also Tr.

satisfy

the Summit

County

had not passed to Westcor,
220-21)
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requirements
Inc.,

at that

Rogers did not contradict this

statement even though the question as to why Bitner Co. signed the Escrow
Agreement was raised at the trial.

The Escrow Agreement, then, is not

pconf

of a joint venture.
Throughout the trial,

as the trial court examined any

between Bitner Co. and Westcor or Monson,

relationship

Rogers demanded that the Real Est.

Contract (with the ancilliary agreements), must be allowed to speak for themselves, and so they do.

(Tr. 355-56, 360, 525; see Ex. 23P)

agreements to which Rogers referred,

(Ex.

23P)

It is the very

which contain no provision and

not even any inference that Westcor intended to share losses with Bitner Co.
The agreements obviate any argument that Bitner Co. had any control over the
development or the finance of Park Ridge after the signing of those agreements.

Rogers should be held to his own evidentiary demands, and on those

demands, he loses his claim.
B.

There is no concrete averment nor substantiated finding of fact which
would allow the trial court to find a joint venture between Bitner Co.
and Westcor or Monson as to Rogers under the theory of joint venture by
estoppel toward third parties.
The trial court, in finding an alleged joint venture between Bitner

Co.

and Westcor or Monson,

discussed above.

appears to rely primarily on the documentation

However, the trial court also makes some references to sur-

rounding circumstances and appearances, which, though ambiguous, may have
suggested to the trial court that it could find a joint venture by es toppel tu
a third party.

That conclusion does not, however, withstand scrutiny.

A joint venture by estoppel toward a third party occurs when,
despite the intent of parties,
believe that the

requirements for

venturers have been met,
ances,

and third,

their actions lead a third party first,

second,

a joint venture between the alleged

101nl

to place reasonable reliance on those appear

to act upon that reasonable reliance to its detriment.

Am. Jur. 2d §9, pp. 30-31.

to

46

This Court has accepted the doctrine of estoppel and has said:
We do not question the soundness of that doctrine under proper
circumstances.
But it is a doctrine of equity which the plaintiff could claim the benefit of only by showing the facts required to justify its application.
These would include that the
defendants were aware of all the material facts; that in such
awareness they made the promise when they knew that the plaintiff was acting in reliance on it; that the latter, observing
reasonable care and prudence, acted in reliance on the promise
and got into a position where it suffered a loss.
Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Ut.2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000, 1003-04
(Utah

1964).

Those conditions are not met by Rogers here,

and the trial

court's conclusion that there was a joint venture is clearly erroneous.
Rogers and his wife both admitted that from 1979 through early 1980
both of

them

relied entirely on Westcor.

Rogers' reliance on Westcor was

justified by the sales agreement with Westcor alone.
struction of the houses,

Rogers planned the con-

the obtaining of construction loans and the planned

sales of the houses when only Westcor was on the scene.

Cross-examination of

Rogers elicited the following admissions:
Q

Did he [" representative of Westcor] eve« indicate to you
that there was any kind of a contract between Westcor and
Milton O. Bitner Company?

A

No.

Q

Did he ever indicate to you that Westcor and Milton O.
Bitner Company were either partners or joint ventures in
this project?

A

No.

Q

Did he make any representations to you that Westcor was in
fact the developer?

A

At that time, yeah.

Q

In your conversations with Mr. Bitner on the construction
site, did he P er indicate to you that Milton O. Bitner
Company and Westcor were partners or joint venturers?

A

That is what I understood anyway.

No.
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Q

Did he ever indicate to you by what authority Bitner
Excavating was putting in improvements?

A

No.

Q

A
Q

Did he ever indicate that he was operating under contract
from Westcor?
Blaine didn't, no.
So it is your testimony then that you observed the improvements going in but you had no idea who was putting them in
or by what authority?

A

I know who was putting them in.

Q

All right.
Let me reword that.
You had no idea who was
responsible ultimately for putting them in 7

A

Well, at the very early stage of it I assumed that Westcor
had the responsibility to do it.

Q

How early?

A

Oh, all the way up to probably have to be maybe right in
July and August of '79.

Q

And what did you base that assumption on 7

A

Well, just through conversations, really.

Q

Do you remember with who?

A

No.

Q

Is it your conversation, your testimony then that you went
for a period of three months, you obtained a large construction loan and then you proceeded ahead on mnstruction
for maybe two or three months or possibly even longer before
you had any idea who the developer was and who was responsible for putting in the improvements?

A

Well, let's see, I am losing track now.

No, that is not right.

I knew who the developer was.

Q

Okay.
Well, then that was my question.
out who the developer was 1

A

Well, at the time that
closed out the loan or even, yeah
I guess it was about the time when we closed out the loan.

Q

So was it Mr Hunt that you found that out from, or was it
Mr. Kilbourne?
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When did you find

A
Q

A

It might have been Kilbourne.

am not too sure of that.

Did Mr. Kilbourne or Mr. Hunt ever indicate to you that
Michael !sic, Milton] O. Bitner Company was either the
developer or had responsibility for putting in the improvements'
No.

Not at this time, no.

Irr. 96-99, see, also Tr. 642-43, Tr. 741)

In early 1980,

Westcor had defaulted as to Rogers because the im-

provements Westcor had promised were not installed.
defaulted as to Bitner Co.

under the Real Est. Contract.

negotiating its way out of the Real Est.

Contract,

Westcor had also
Wes tcor was then

and the Trust Agreement was

being developed as the vehicle to resolve that problem with Bitner Co.
Rogers learned from other purchasers that they were planning to
bring suit pursuant to the Escrow Agreement with Summit County.
despite this information, took no action.
of the Escrow Agreement.

Rogers,

he never even checked on the status

(Tr. 740-44)

Because of the disputes raised by the other purchasers and because
of Westcor's various defaults,

Bitner Co.

funded the extended Escrow Agreement

and also s19ned the Trust Agreement with Westcor,

hoping to be able to protect

the value of the lar.d which would thereupon revert to it because of Westcor's
breach.
in

the

Bitner Co.

the first

had been induced by Westcor to sign the Escrow Agreement

place because Bitner Co.

understood that the original seller of

land was required by the County to sign the Escrow Agreement.

When a

Lourt order enforcing the Escrow Agreement as to the County was obtained,
Kiinn Co.

was required by its earlier signature to make the improvements at
Blaine Bitner testified why Bitner Co.

signed the

original Escrow Agreement:
Q

Nine davs later you signed an escrow fund agreement with
Summit County, though didn't you?
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They [Westmr I came back to us and said th"'r

A

That is right.
had to have it.

Q

And then two months or so later you signed protective cove
nants with Summit County?

A

Whatever was needed,
[Westcor's I attorney.

Q

And Summit County told you you had to sign that, too?

A

That is right.

Q

As landowners?

A

As the original fee holder.

Q

Even though you didn't have any of the property any mor<>'

A

That is right.

Q

Isn't it true that you really did want to keep a finger in
the pie?

A

No, we didn't. We wanted to get rid of it because we were
interested in other, we had, I had plenty of work to do.
was working in the livesto~k and those of you that know, it
is a 24-hour emergency. Constantly.

(Tr. 221-22)
Agreement

why that was handled through th<"

Bitner Co., because it had sold the land and signed the

was,

in effect,

being forced

Escro~

to cure the breach and default by

Westcor.
At some time,

after

realizing Westcor's

defaults,

Rogers contacted

Blaine Bitner to complain of Westcor's default.

Blaine Bitner responded that

he guessed something would have to be done.

But by that time, Rogers had

already taken all his actions to build the houses in reliance on Westcnr.
Bitner Co.

had

before that time.

no relationship or

responsibility

to Rogers

at

that

time o··

Bitner Co.'s only responsibility thereafter arose from thr

Escrow Agreement and was limited only to the terms and requirements of lha
Agreement as interpreted through the judgment in the case brought by oliic'
purchasers.

Lynn, et al. v. Westcor, et al., Third District Summit Co. (Civil

No. 5985, 1980)
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The trial court, however, may have decided that there was reliance
''" Rogers and seems to convince itself of this conclusion primarily because
111d1ne Bitner appeared from time to time at the development site and because
he was the president of Excavation Co.
under contract with Westcor.

which was doing part of the work

(Findings,

R. 717 #13)

there

Rogers never claimed

that he relied on these appearances.
Blaine Bitner's appearances at the development site were either
those of an interested creditor, concerned with whether or not the party with
which

Bitner Co.

stood in a contractural obligation was going to be able to

pay Bitner Co. for the land or those of the president of Excavation Co.,
had a separate contractual

duty

to perform excava, rig services.

which

It is not

unusual for the principal of a creditor company, especially when the creditor
is the seller of land,

to be interested in the progress of the debtor's busi-

ness operations, as it is not uncommon for a creditor to examine his debtor's
operatic s, assessing the debtor's ability to repay the debt.
Blaine Bitner's vists to the site as president of Excavation Co.

no

more created the appearance of a joint venture than would the appearance of
any other creditor or contractor on
allegation in

the site of a developer.

the complaint and no factual

There is

no

statement or evidence in the trial

testimony to show that Rogers was even aware that Bitner Co. existed when
Rugers first saw Blaine Bitner at the site or even at the time Rogers began to
realize that Westcor would probably

!"IOI

succeed in providing the improvements

'>'lestcor alone had promised.
Joint

ventureship by estoppel,

as

in any other case of estoppel,

m:.st arise from a reasonable expectation based on promises or appearances.
The only

~estcor,

reasonable appearance was that Excavation Co.

was a contractor to

the party with whom Rogers had a contractural relationship.
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Rogers

could

see that Westcor had engaged Excavation Co.

to perform services,

had no reason to see or infer anything other than that.

Roger,

Seeing Blaine Bitner

supervise excavating work would not suggest to a reasonable person that

1,

could rely on an excavator as a joint venturer.
The record also shows that Rogers made little or no effort to deter
mine Westcor's standing or to determine why or whether Westcor would or woulc
not be able to complete development of the subdivision improvements it har:
promised, even though other purchasers had told Rogers of the Escrow Agreement
and their planned suit.
who was

the escrow

Rogers admitted that he had not asked Summit Count,
guarantor

of

the development

until

well

after

he had

decided to buy the lots and build the houses and had obtained loans and begun
the construction.
ject.

(Tr. 741-44)

Bitner Co. was nowhere present on the pro-

Any reasonable investigation by

Rogers would have revealed the relation-

ship among the parties with whom he had contact,

~'

Westcor and Excavation

Co.
To sustain an allegation of joint venture by estoppel toward a third
party,

Rogers

(as the third party)

must allege and prove that he acted in

reliance on the existence of the alleged joint venture in
leading
damage,

to

the losses.

piece

relationship.

Rogers

may

not,

after

taking actions

having acted and

sustained

together information to allege the creation of a joint venture
Hindsight will not create actual reliance to prove an estoppel.

Rogers cannot create such obi igations from whole cloth and then use the creation to prove a joint venture by estoppel reliance.
did not so rely.

Rogers and Mrs, Roger'

Like Rogers, Bitner Co. was caught by Westcor's breachfi

Being a fellow victim with Rogers, however, no more makes Bitner Co. a 1oi11I
venturer with Westcor than Rogers himself was.
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c.

The plaintiffs were not intended third party beneficiaries
purported trust agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor.
This

brief
third

uses

the

olrler

"creditor

party

0 r1es,

who as a matter of law,

term

"intended

beneficiary"

which they are not promisees.

to

beneficiary"

refer

third

party

the

than

the

benefici-

may obtain direct benefit of an agreement to
"Creditor" beneficiary is a term of art, which,

as this court

noted in Clark v. American Standard

!Utah 1978),

is

confusing.

to

rather

of

Simply

Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620

being a creditor in the debtor-creditor

<ense is not enough to make such a creditor an intended third party beneAs this Court stated in Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. First Security

i1c1ary.
~~·

9 Ut.

" ... where,

2d 215, 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959), an intended beneficiary arises
from the nature of the contract,

it is plainly evident to the

promissor that the contract is for the benefit of third parties ••• "
added.)
ficiaries",

(Emphasis

The trial court in this case simply used the term "third party beneleaving

unclear

what

brought

it

to

find

intended

beneficiaries.

Bitner Co. did not create or agree to any document or take any action which
made Rogers an intended beneficiary.
I.

The Trust Agreement was void due to

failure of a condition subseguent.

Paragraph 6 of the Trust Agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor
1Ex.

28P)

contains a cnndition subsequent which must be fulfilled or the agree-

ment (and hence the Hold Harmless Clause) becomes null and void.

The Trust

Agreement provides:
6.
Bitner and Westcor agree to both use their best efforts
in obtaining clear title and possession of the Uniform Real
Estate Contracts on the aforementioned lots.
If said contracts
cannot be recovered by November 15, 1980, this agreement shall
become null and void, the original contract shall become in full
force, and all amounts received and disbursed by Davis shall be
accounted for and applied against the original contract, and all
items assigned to Davis shall be assigned back to Westcor.
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Bitner

Co.

testified

that

the condition

subsequent

had

not

fulfilled and that Bitner Co. considered the agreement null and void.

been
Blaine

Bitner testified on direct examination:
You're holding Westcor harmless right now, aren't you?

Q

A

(Tr. 226)

No.
And that was, when that agreement was signed, I would
have to ask Mr. Davis, but there is a stipulation in there
that if certain things weren't done within thirty days that
was null and void, and that is what I told you previously.
Blaine Bitner continued:

Q

Why didn't you file anything against them in this lawsuit?
If they cheated you and double-crossed you why are you still
standing on the same side of the fence as Westcor, if they
are the ones you did the damage?
THE WITNESS: We don't, we don't hold them harmless.
contradict you on that.

We, I

(Tr. 227, 228)
Since the condition

required Westcor's best efforts and

dent that Westcor did nothing,
mony that Westcor disagreed.
the

Bitner Co.

it

is evi-

is correct despite Manson's testi-

The inactions of Westcor cannot be overcome by

mere assertions of Manson's

opinion.

Because of

the obvious

conflict

between the views of Bitner Co. and Westcor, their joint counsel did nothing
more to strengthen the record.

(See Section Ill below.)

derance of evidence in the record,

But on the prepon-

the trial court could properly find only

that the Agreement between Bitner Co. and Westcor is null and void as a matter
of law.

Thus, no Trust Agreement (or Hold Harmless Clause) exists under which

Westcor can be held harmless by Bitner Co. or under which Rogers may claim to
be a third party beneficiary.

An agreement which is null and void also cannot

support a joint venture theory.
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Even if the Trust Agreement is not null and void, the enforcement of the
Hold Harmless Clause cannot be enforced to exculpate Westcor and Monson
from their own wrongful and fraudulent acts.

2.

The trial court found that Westcor had failed to fund the Escrow
Agreement guaranteeing the completion of improvements in Park Ridge.
R.

717

#14)

It also found

l~inding

that Westcor was a "show" corporation without

proper capitalization (Finding,

R.

719 #19)

and that Monson and Westcor had

diverted funds received from payments on contracts on lots sold in Park Ridge
"' other business enterprises or to purposes having nothing to do with Park
Rirlge, despite the fact that Westcor's obligations at Park Ridge were unpaid
or·

otherwise unsatisfied.

(Finding R. 719 #20)

specifica .y in regard to Rogers,

The

t~ial

court also found,

that Westror and Monson had made

?

0 '

>gnments

or purported assignments of contracts or deeds on the lots Rogers had bought,
which assignments had nu validity whatsoever at any time.
#43)
to the

(Finding R. 726

The trial court also found that Westcor and Monson had clouded the title
Rogers' property

title in Rogers.

by

those fraudulent

(Finding R. 732 # 15)

assigr

The findings show by clear and con-

vincing evidence that Westcor and Monson were g•.
724 ##34,

35)

rits and thus quieted

y of fraud.

(Finding R.

The trial court specifically found no fraudulent acts whatso-

ever on the part of the principals of Bitner Co.
all, let alone clear or convincing evidence,

There was no evidence at

that B 1aine Bitner,

as principal

and only actor for Bitner Co., did anything wrong, let alone anything fraudulent.

(Finding R. 734 #21)

Hence, there was no evidence of fraud committed

by Bitner Co. itself.

The trial court,

in finding Rogers to be a third party beneficiary

of the Trust Agreement, would allow Rogers to recover against Bitner Co. in
place of Monson or Westcor, who themselves are barred from recovering under
the Trust Agreement because of their own fraud.
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To allow Westcor or Monson to

be exculpated from their wrongful and fraudulent acts and to be held harrnles 1
While a party may contract out of it. 1

of those acts offends public policy.
negligence,
intent,

it cannot contract out of fraud;

wrongfulness and distasteful

activity

fraud involves a high degree of
for

which

the defrauder rnust

In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602,

bear its own responsibility.

608 (Utah

19711), this Court stated:

The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect a person against his own fraud as a matter of public
policy.
A contract limitation ••• is valid only in the absence
of allegations or proof of fraud.
The Hold Harmless Clause simply cannot be used to exonerate Westcor
and Monson, even if the Trust Agreement were not a nullity.
party

beneficiary

to

recover

when

his

promisee

cannot

To allow a third

recover

allows the

promisee to escape the consequences of his fraudulent acts as much as if the
promisee were able to recover directly.

Such a recovery by a third party is

equally in violation of equitable principles.
no Hold Harmless Clause.

Indeed,

at that level,

there 1s

If the Trust Agreement is not null and void, it is

valid and operative only within the limits that the law and public policy
permit.
Alleged third party beneficiaries can take no greater benefit than
the actual parties to such an agreement.
original contract promised.

They have nothing more than the

Once the trial court found fraud had been

committed by Monson and Westcor, Monson and Westcor were outside the limits of
the Hold Harmless Clause, and so were any potential third party beneficiaries.
This is particularly true on the explicit finding that the representatives of
Bitner Co. were innocent of fraud and committed no wrongful acts.
of fraud against Bitner Co.

Any t•1n'

can come only through the alledged but unsubstan-

tiated claims of partnership with Westcor.

Rogers' remedy,

then, lies against

Westcor and Monson; that Rogers has won, and that portion of the judgment
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awarding Rogers damages against Westcor and Monson should not be disturbed.
1

,,deed, Rogers' remedy there is direct and clear;

2 r111anced

by a spurious attempt to ensnare Bitner Co.

it need not be padded or
into paying for the fraud

of others.
Even if the Trus Agreement were valid (which Bitner Co. does not
concede), the plaintiffs are not, as a matter of law, intended third party
beneficiaries of that contract who could directly enforce the Hold
Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement against Bitner Co.

3,

Even assuming,

arguendo,

that the Hold Harmless Clause in the Trust

Agreement were valid and could have been enforced by Westcor, Rogers is merely
an "incidental" beneficiary to it.

In Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Ut.2d

418, 420, 446 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1968), this ( ourt cited with approval
Corbin's illustration describing incidental third party oeneficiaries:
Where A owe> money to creditor C or several creditors, and B
promises A to supply him with money necessary to pay such debts,
no creditor may maintain a suit against B on this promise.
Corbin's illustration

is exactly the same as the relationship between

and Bitner Co. if the Trust Agreement were not null and void.
at most,

Roge~s

Bitner Co. had,

promised under the Tr .isl Agreement to pay Westa>r should claims arise

out of the situation
creditors to Westcor,

described in the Trust Agreement.

Thus,

Rogers,

as

cannot maintain suit against Bitner Co. because of its

Corbin-like promise.
4.

The Trust Agreement and the joint venture theory are not supported by any
collateral estoppel theory.
Rogers and Bennett both attempted to introduce into trial a discus-

'""' of the Lynn case, Lynn et al. v. Westcor, et al.. 3rd District Summit
Dunty,
'

11

ent.

(unreported,

Civil No.

<985,

1980) involving only the Escrow Agree-

Though their intent in introducing the case is ambiguous, they seem to

"rque that the decision in the unrelated case creates collateral estoppel
•hich prevents Bitner Co. from arguing the nullity of the Trust Agreement or
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proving

that

there

was

no 101nt

case in

its findings of fact.

neitht>r

Ro(_Jers

the

nor

tent

damage

extt-nt,
doing

the
so,

situation
trial

(F1nc11ngs,

BennPtt,

They

cross-claim.

venture.

R,

717-18 •15)

collateral

alle~1erl

proffered no evidence at

1n 1=_yri_r1

court

relied

to

estopµeJ
trial

create collateral

on

any

collateral

because no orders or rulings

in

Howevt>r,
in

to show

estoppel,

estoppel

the

no par•,,

comµla1r1t
an equ1\,....

that

If,

theory,

ancJ
it

to th,

errerl

that case and no evidence or aver

ment that the factual situation was 1dent1cal to that controlling this

If

such

a finding

was of substantial

conclusions of law and fact,
D,

c;is,

any finding based on Lynn should be ignored.

Thus,

was proffered in evidence,

1r

help

to the

trial

judge in

reach111,1

such a finding constitutes reversible error,

If, as the trial court found, Rogers is a third party beneficiary of th.
Escrow Agreement, Rogers' rights of enforcement under that agreement are
only equal to those of Summit County and do not extend to an action fur
consequential damages.
It

is

black

letter law

that

the

rights of a

third party benefic1an

to an agreement do not and cannot exceed the rights accorded the main part1e>
to
Ut.

In

t ht> agreement.
2d 228,

party
third

291

Cnnt inPntal

Bank

dnd

Trust

P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1955),

to enforce a

contract.

party could not

the original promisee.

However,

recover more

than

v.

R. W.

Stew a~, 4

this Court found a right of thir"

the
that

Ccrnp~ny

Court
which

specifically held

was

thdt th,

due and recoverable h1

The Court stated·

The ta .. is well settled that the rights of a third person to sue
on a contract made for his benefit depend on the terms of th~
agreement and are not greater than those of the promisee.
The trial recorc shows that Summit County, exercising its reasonah1·
discretion.
24 months.
form,

extended its Escrow Agreement with Bitner Co. beyond the or1<J1r'
Bitner Co.,

to the extent it was required by the County to P"'

did so within the alto .. ed extension.

There was thus no uncured breac

1
•

'" R1tner Co. to the County, and no question of further action to be 'aken by
County.
The Escrow Agreement between Bitner Co.
,te·l 1n

nature.

and Summit County was lim-

The County could require only that the monies

held in the

'""'" fund be used to complete subdivision improvements if the improvements
•ere

not

finished

by

the

time

specified

in

the Escrow Agreement or

in

its

The Escrow Agreement did not foresee or create other causes of
"r11on

and

\greement

does
was

not

purport

designed

to

allow

consequential

solely to provide for

damages.

The

Escrow

improvements when and if the

'"'provements had not been completed.*
Since the object of the Escrow Agreement is to assure that improvements will be made,

the interest of the purchaser in any lot in a subdivision

s that they be made and that the purchaser himself not be obligated to pay
'or them.

If the County must exercise

its

rights under the Escrow Agreement,

is right is to cause improvements to be made.
1uire<1 in order
improvements

iselt for

its

to prevent

to be

made.

the

County from

The funds being held are reincurring loss in requiring the

The County cculd use the escrow funds

to

reimburse

use of its own employees and equipment if it decided to install

the improvements or,

in the more usual case,

to pav an independent contractor

:u make the improvements.
The true third party beneficiarv to such an Escrow Agreement is the
'"1ependent entity
~1

which

becomes engaged

to make

the

e'I of the County if there is a failure by the obligee.

improvements

at

the

The County's job

!: appears that the result of the Lynn case, in which the County was made a
mandatory party, was a new escrow agreement between Bitner Co. and the
I ounty.
The County was sat1Sfied with the result in that case and witr the
"' t1011s carried out as a result of it.
The County felt no f~rther need to
dd and has taken no further act pursuant to the Escrow Agreement.
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is to see that the improvements are done at no cost to the purchaser and at nn
cost to itself and to see that the costs are paid to the entity who did the
work or supplied any materials necessary to the improvements.

The County ''

not and cannot be concerned with alleged consequential damages;

it insures

that the improvements will be made by requiring an escrow fund;

it neither

does,

nor

has an obligation to,

The County

insure against anything else.

itself suffers no damage from delay;

so long as it has funds to provide for

improvements at no cost to itself or a purchaser of an unimproved lot who also
purchases the promise that there will be improvements,

the County has satis-

fied itself and any regulations it may have with regard to the improvement of
land.
In this case, Rogers did not pay for the improvements or any of the
materials that went into them.

He thus cannot stand in the County's shoes tu

collect the costs of improvements against the escrow fund;

Rogers' sole

recourse lies against Westcor and Monson in a simple contract action.
the

completion

of

the subdivision

improvements,

the Escrow

Upon

Agreement was

fulfilled and no other right or obligations between the parties pertained.
E.

The Trial Court Erred in Calculating Damages to Rogers.
Even

if

this

liable to Rogers for

Court

should determine that

Bitner Co.

damages

allegedly arising from

delays

somehow

in completion of

improvements, any damages awarded must be properly calculated.
the trial court is too high and should be reduced.

is

The award by

Rogers claimed damages for

loss of profit on Earnest Money Contracts made to sell the houses he constructed because of the alleged failure of Westcor to perform contractural obligations timely.

Had Westcor performed, Rogers would have made a profit based

upon the Earnest Money Agreements with the prospective buyers.
722 #30)
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(Findings R.

Those Earnest Money Agreements were binding contractural obligations, subject only to the condition that the improvements of the subdivision
1e completed,

which was the obligation of Westcor.

It was upon failure of the

'arnest Money Agreements that Rogers' cause of action arose.

Rogers' two

contracts were to sell the two homes (which he said cost him $105,419.95 and
Si06,689.00),

for $130,000.00 each.

By the terms of the Earnest Money

Contracts, then, Rogers had contracted for sales which wculd have given them
profits of $47,891.05.
Rogers should not,

as a matter of equity and law, be allowed to

purport that other, unproven contractural agreements could have been entered
into because Rogers would have had no opportunity to enter into later contractural agreements without breaching the existing ones.
of making

such

new

contracts

are

speculative on

The possibilities

their face,

and

thus an

inadequate basis for alleged damages.
To
raised,

the extent Bitner Co.

liable for

calculateci

on

the

any

damages

realities

of

to

may be,
the

despite the arguments already

plaintiffs,

the contractural

those damages

situation

existing

should be
when

this

cause of action arose, not on hypothetical damages based on an inflated, subsequent appraisal.

Had there been no breach, Rogers' profits were fixed by

his own agreements at $47,891.05.

Rogers should not be permitted to increase

the benefits of his own bargain at the expense of Bitner Co., which never had
any direct obligation to Rogers.

Furthermore, the obligation of a party who

'' being damaged by a breach of contract is to mitigate his damages,

not to

"ornate t11em.

Rogers did, of course, mitigate by selling.

The eventual buyers of

the property were those very same persons who had entered into the original
Earnest Money Agreements.

To purport that they would have paid a higher price
-31-

than what they had originally bargained to pay only a few months after the
Earnest Money Agreements were signed is pure speculation, just as it is pur"
speculation to daim that other,

unknown persons would have bought despite the

well-known problems in the housing market.
The maximum permissible award to Rogers, then, is the selling price
under the earnest money agreements ($260,000.00 on the houses and two lots)
minus the mitigating,
lots), or $4 7, 89 1. O5.

actual sale price ( $2 12, 108. 95) on the two houses and
The judgment should,

at minimum, be reduced to that

amount, and interest recalculated on the basis of the reduced figure.
II.

THE TRIAL CX>URT ERRED IN HOLDING BITNER CX>. JOINTLY AND SEVERAU Y
LIABLE WITH DEFEl'..[)ANTS YESTCX>R, M)N5()N Af\D BADCER TO BENl'ETT.
To find Bitner Co.

jointly and severally liable to Bennett, the

trial court had to find that either there was some privily of contract among
Bitner Co.,

Westcor, Monson and Badger with regard to Bennett and his loan or

that the Trust Agreement created an intended third party beneficiary interest
in Bennett as to Bitner Co.

A Ithough the trial court is less than clear on

the law, it seems to have found liability primarily on the basis of the second
theory.
A.

Nonetheless, neither theory was proven on the facts.

There was no Joint Venture of Intent.
Bitner has argued above under sections I A and I B, that there was

never a joint venture of any kind between Bitner Co. and Westcor or Monson.
It

reincorporates those arguments with direct

reference

claim and respectfully refers the Court to them.

to Bennett's cross-

Those arguments are <even

stronger with regard to Bennett who never had any contact with Park Ridge; ht
merely loaned money to Westcor, Monson and Badger who purported to asS19 11
contracts to secure the loan.

Bitner Co.

incurred no risks of loss and nl

profits from dealing with Bennett and had no control of any sort over any loan
from Bennett.

Bennett's transactions meet none of the joint venture criteria

-32-

recogn 1zed by this Court with regard to Bitner Co.

Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d

111tah 1974).
There was no joint venture by estoppel toward a third party in regard to
Bennett.
Bennett made no claim and offered no proof that a joint venture by
estoppel toward a third party was created am<
and Badger by the actions of those parties.
amended

answer

and

cross-claim,

Bennett

g Bitner Co., Westcor, Monson

(See Tr. 840-60)
did

not

In his second

allege that the Westcor,

Monson and Badger partnership represented to him that they or any one of them
were engaged in any joint venture or partnership with Bitner Co.

He made no

prr"er of evidence at trial that Westcor. Monson and Badger stated or even
felt that they were acting other than for themselves individually or as a
partne ship

comprised only

of

themselves

in

obtaining loans from

Bennett.

"Jeither Bennett nor anyone else offered any evidence or made any allegation
that Bennett thought otherwise when he made the loans.
Bennett, the former president of a major bank. described himself as
a sophisticated investor.

He testified with satisfaction about his successful

efforts to obtain the signatures of Monson for Westcor and of Badger individually,

to assure himself of Badger's

personal

liability and obligation on his

(Tr. 854)

loans to Wes!cor, Monson and Badger.

He did not want liability

1ust from Westcor and Badger's now defunct corporations, but the liability of
1 heir

principals as

Bennett neither saw

well.

thought there was privily or any other
dnd his

loans.

Indeed,

in

relations~·'P

nor could allege that he
with or between Bitner Co.

the trial court's findings of fact and law,

it is

•indear whether the trial judge found any privity which would have made Bitner
Co.

jointly and severally liable for the debts of Westcor, Monson ana Badger.

!See,

Findings,

R.

725-29)

However,

any ambiguity which exists in this regard

must be resolved in favor of Bitner Co.
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C.

Even if a formal joint venture based on the documents could be found_
there is no evidence or finding that Westcor' Monson and Badger WP/
acting in behalf of such an alleged joint venture when they obtained ,
loan from Bennett.
e

While it is clear in the law that any partner acting by himself ma,
represent and bind the partnership to which he belongs in the course of the
partnership's business,

it does not follow that a partnership or joint venture

is responsible for all obligations of its venturers.

A person may be a part-

ner in several separate partnerships or ventures,

and he cannot by himself

link all his various dealings by the simple fact of the multiplicity of his
own ventures and activities.

A partner in a law firm may enter into a part-

nership or venture with his accountant brother to develop a plot of land into
condominiums,

and he may promise his cut of the profits at the law firm to

build the condominium, but that does not entitle someone purchasing a condominium unit to sue the law firm because the lawyer and the accountant did not
pay to put the roof on the condominium,

nor can the law finn sue to obtain any

profits from the construction and sale of the condominium, even if it knew the
lawyer was making such investments with his cut.

Partnership liability does

not extend nearly so far.
In this case,

Westcor and Monson had an obligation to install cer-

lain improvements in Park
lion,

Ridge.

or so Monson testified,

partnership

which

would

alleged nor attempted

(Tr.

borrow

To obtain financing to fulfill that obliga285-96) he agreed with Badger to form a
money for

that purpose.

Bennett

neither

to prove through his own testimony that the loans he

made were made to any person or entity other than Westcor, Monson and Bad[Je<
or a partnership composed of those three (or any part of them).

Thus,

even 11

the alleged joint venture between Bitner Co. and Westcor-Monson ever ex1sto>d
Bennett's loans were not made to that joint venture, but rather to Westcor ann
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\\onson
~

(and

their

partner

Badger)

to

allow

Monson

and

Westcor

to fulfill

e• tear's obi i gat ions to make the improvements.
Bennett's loan to l'testcor-Monson and Badger was, as far as Bennett

lid'

1

concerned and as far as they were concerned and represented at the time,

,,ade only to those parties.

Bennett knew with whom he dealt,

and he took

precautions to protect h1mself--but not with regard to Bitner Co., because it
was never connected to his loans.
D.

Even if an alleged joint venture including Bitner Co. did exist, the
actions of Westcor, Monson and Badger in relation to Bennett were, by
statute, not actions of that joint venture.
The Uniform Partnership Act of Utah,

U. C.A. §ll8-1-6(3)a,

states that:

Unless authorized b-, the other partners ••. one or more but less
ihan all of the partners have no authority to:
a.
Assign
creditors ••••

the

Monson and Badger,

partnership

property

in dealing with Bennett,

in

trust

assigned the alleged
They thu< did

assets of a partnership in trust for their creditor Bennett.
exactly that which cannot be done without the authority of
partners.

for

!!!

of the alleged

Those assets assigned to Bennett were contracts and notes payable

to Westcor,

as previously described.

Those assets,

which would have been

assets of any broader partnership if it existed, were assigned to Bennett as a
creditor and were to be acted upon by the Monson-Badger partnership in trust
for Bennett.
the loans

Badger was to arrange to discount and sell those assets to repay

Bennett had made to Monson, Westcor and Badger.

By statute, Bitner

Co. cannot be found a party to the assignment and trust because Bitner Co.

oe1ther signed nor consented in any way to the agreement.
lid

~

the partners

opprove the assignment into trust for their creditor Bennett, and all the

rortners were Westcor, Monson and Badger.
ments were thus met.

The Uniform Partnership Act require-

Bitner Co. was no part of the whole partnership.
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Bennett,
actions
tions

as

as a self-described sophisticated businessman and in h 11

he testified

when

he

states

to

them,

that

he

in

was

fact

acknowledges the statutory

careful

to

require

Monson and Badger to sign the note on his loan.
contemplated any
made the loan,

liability or obligation on

~

parties,

(Tr. 853-55)

Westcor

Bennett never

the part of Bitner Co.

and he did not think of it as a partner.

limita-

when he

The possibility of

claiming against Bitner Co. was a pleasant afterthought developed by him when
he learned that a hitherto unheard of entity,

"M.O.

Bitner

Company" had

Since it is evident that Bitner Co.

originally owned the land at Park Ridge.

never consented to the assignments to Bennett, if Bennett is to claim recovery
pursuant to those assignments,

he must concur with and acknowledge the statu-

tory requirements by asserting that

~

parties to the partnership consented.

Since he has the acknowledged consent of Westcor, Monson and Badger,
acknowledge that they are the only partners involved.
Monson and Badger,
ment to him

he must

These three, Westcor,

are the partners who oould and did oonsent to the assign-

in trust as

their creditor,

just as

they

were the obligors he

sought for the loans.
E.

The trial court erred in finding Bennett to be a direct third party
beneficiary under the Trust Agreement among Bitner Co., Westcor and
Monson.
The trial court held that Bennett was an intended primary benefi-

ciary of the Hold Harmless Clause in the Trust Agreement between Bitner Co.
and Monson.

(Findings R. 731 #8)

In its reasoning,

the trial court stated

that:
The other parties to the agreement knew that there might be
allegations to individuals in the position of Bennett and that
the agreement would give those in the position of Bennett the
benefits of promises and representations made by Monson/Westcor.
(Findings R. 729 #47) (Emphasis added.)
of fact,

even

if it were the case,

the
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While Bitner Co. denies this finding
trial court erroneously

reached the

conclusion of law, based on that erroneous finding,
intended third
1\

that Bennett was an

party beneficiary of the Hold Harmless

Clause of the Trust

gt-eement.
The trial court had to use the word "might" because there is no

evidence in the record to convince it that Bitner Co. knew of the existence,
nature or extent of Westcor or Mon son's debts and obi igations to Bennett.
trial court thus made a finding which is only a guess.
such knowledge,

The

Even if Bitner Co. had

it would not have made Bennett any more than what he was, an

incidental benef1c ary of the Hold Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement.

If

a person such as Bennett "might" have been contemplated when the Trust Agreement was made,

then there is and can be no direct link between the Trust

Agreement and Bennett.

Bennett is even worse off than Rogers in demonstrating

that he is beneficiary.

Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Ut.2d 418, 446 P.2d

414, 416 (Utah 1968).

The Court is respectfully referred to the discussion in

sections IB and IC above.
A

hold

harmless agreement is

subject to a condition subsequent,

namely. that the party to be held harmless must show a claim by another relevant to and covered by the hold harmless agreement.
totally outside the scope of the Trust Agreement.

Bennett's claim is

Furthermore,

Bennett cannot

meet the standards in situations in which this Court did find a third party
beneficiary to a contract.
291 P.2d 890

(Utah

1955),

Jn the Continental Bank case, supra, 4 Ut.2d 228,
the Court found a direct third party beneficiary

interest in a creditor solely because the debt to the third party was specif,._at!y referred to in the agreement between the first and second parties.

agreement

in

The

that case specified that the first party would pay directly to

\he third party beneficiary the debts owed by the second party.

That created

a situation in which the third party or the beneficiary was known as a
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"creditor" beneficiary (or,

as this court now describes this relationship, an

"intended"

the

beneficiary)

at

time

the

two

primary

parties

entered their

Bennett and his loan are not mentioned in the Trust Agreement, and

agreement.

there is no evidence that Bennett's debt was contemplated by Bitner Co. in
order to enhance Bennett's status beyond that of an incidental beneficiary.
Thus, Bennett has no rights or claim under the Trust Agreement.
F.

Even if Bennett were an intended third party beneficiary of the Trust
Agreement (which he is not), he could not enforce the Agreement because
the Agreement is specifically unenforceable by Westcor or Monson as to
their obligation to Bennett.
The trial court found Westcor and Monson's relationship with Bennett

fraught

with

fraud,

both

obligation to Bennett.

in the inception and

(Findings,

in the failure

R. 726-28 #43)

to pay their

Were Monson or Westcor

allowed to enforce the Hold Harmless Clause of the Trust Agreement against
Bitner Co. in respect to Westcor's obligation to Bennett, Westcor and Monson
would be allowed to exculpate themselves from and be held harmless from their
own fraudulent

acts,

a result

against such an occurrence.

which

would violate an express public policy

See Lamb, supra, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). and

the discussion in Section I C2 above.
Absent fraud against Bennett by Westcor, Monson and Badger, their
debts to Bennett would have been fully satisfied by the contracts they
assigned to Bennett and held in trust for him, as was intended.

Thus, the

debt to Bennett remains unpaid solely because of the fraud of Monson, Westcor
and Badger.
hold

Maintaining joint and several

in Bitner Co.

under a

harmless agreement will allow Monson and Badger to escape unscathed from

their own evil acts.
offense against equity.

The result is a gross violation of public policy and an
The inequitable results of such a holding are doubly

clear because nowhere in
find

liability

that

Bitner

Co.

its findings of facts

participated

in

or
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was

and law

did

the

aware of the fraud

trial courI
committed

against Bennett, and in its findings of law held that B Jaine Bitner, the
~rincipal

committed
iS~

of Bitner Co.

(through whom any fraud of Bitner Co. would have been

if such were the case),

Findings R. 734 #21)

specifically was not party to any fraud.

Westcor and Monson cannot be permitted to commit

fraud with impunity by shifting the costs of fraud to others not part of their
fraud.
G.

The trial court erred in declaring Bitner Co. jointly and severally liable
for punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.00 to Bennett, even if
joint and several liability is upheld as to the rest of Bennett's claim.
The trial court (R. 739) granted Bennett punitive damages in the

amount of $10,000.00 because of fraud on the part of Westcor, Monson and
Badger.

However,

as noted above,

the trial court did not find Bitner Co.

directly guilty of fraud or even knowledgeable of the occurrence of fraud with
regard to Bennett's claims.
The purpose of punitive damages, as their name implies, is to punish
the intentional wrongful acts of those against whom such damages are levied.
They provide recoupment for the intangible damages to the victim of wrongful,
malicious or even criminal actions.

They also provide deterrence and assuage

the public outrage against wrongs such as fraud which are more aggravated
than, for example,
Co.

negligence or simple breach of contract.

To hold Bitner

jointly and severally liable for punitive damages is inequitable and

unjust.

Bitner Co. was not a participant in the acts of fraud which punitive

damages are designed to punish.

Awarding such damages to persons or entities

who did no wrong would detract from their intended effect against Westcor,
Monson and Badger.

The public has no interest in punishing someone who

committed no wrongful act.
pun1tivp effect

of

Those defendants would not feel the brunt or the

those damages,

but wouid simply expand the number of

victims to their fraud.
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The award of an attorney's fee against Bitner Co.
correct.

is likewise in-

There was no reason under the traditional rules governing attorney's

fee awards or under any agreement to which Bitner Co. was a party which woulc
justify such an award, since Bitner Co. was not directly involved in the fraud
of Westcor, Monson and Badger.

Such an award is likewise incorrect as to

Rogers.
111.

The trial court erred in denying the motions for a mistrial made by
defendants' counsel John S. Davis when it became clear that he, as
counsel, could not adequately represent himself, Blaine Bitner, Bitner
Co. Westcor and Monson because of serious and compelling conflicts of
interest.
In the course of the trial,

it became clear to Davis,

to the Judge

and to counsel for both Rogers and Bennett that Davis was involved in a serious conflict of interest in representing more than one defendant.
360,

361,

373,

494,

500,

525-26,

896)

(Tr. 357,

As the trial judge commented in

colloquy during Davis' cross-examination of Blaine Bitner:
Q

Was it ever your impression that Milton 0. Bitner Corporation was going to assume any previous liability or assumption of risk or anything that had been incurred by Westcor?

A

No.
MR. BELNAP:
THE WITNESS:
itself.

MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor.

Your Honor.

No.
The document speaks for

In addition that question goes right to the heart of
the potential conflict between Mr. Davis' client.
Mr.
Monson on the stand yesterday testified that that trust
agreement was in full force and effect in his mind, and that
it was to hold Westcor harmless from their obligations and
liabilities arising out of Park Ridge.
And Mr. Davis we allege, or I allege in this objection,
in addition to the fact that the document speaks for itself
is placing now this client in opposition now to his other
client, which I don't think he should be entitled to do,
even though he is representing both of them, Your Honor.
-40-

MR. DAVIS:
Just asking his understanding of the interP'Hation of this provision, which they have brought up
tr ee or four times and hammered away at on the hold harmless provision.
THE COURT:
Of a>urse that is not what he is saying,
and I am not saying you don't have the right to. But they
have brought that up, except for the fact that you have two
different parties here and you are asking them the same
question and gettins conflicting answers on the question.
MR. DAVIS:

Now--

THE COURT:
And the question is whether you have the
right to represent both of the parties.
ITr. 525-26)

The trial court had already stated that:
THE COURT: \~r. Davis, I think you are treading a very
fine line as far as the individuals or the corporation, the
entities you are representing here.
I think you've got to
be very careful in that situation. I think what Mr. Belnap
says is really true.

(Tr. 361)

Dav is was in fact unable to represent any of the defendants which

he purported to represent adequdtely.
Dav is himself was named as a defendant because of his participation
1n the attempted assignments of contracts which had already been assigned to

Bennett.

The trial a>urt did not award any damages against him.

µresumably a nominal one,
defendant.

and no one daimed that he was other than a nominal

Bt· · with Davis as defendant and as counsel for other defendants,

no opportunit
Badger

His role was

for

could be afforded to Bitner Co.

that

matter)

to

examine

in

(or Westcor and Monson and

pre-trial

or

courtroom

proceedings

anything the others knew which might have helped its defense.
Davis should not have c.ontinued representation of Bitner Co. or of
·'"Y other defendant whose interests were opposite or inimical to the interests
of Bitner Co.

Rogers and Bennett wanted Bitner Co. to be held party to a

Ju1nt venture with Westcor and possibly others so they could, inter
Ull1tribution

for

any

liability.

Bitner
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Co.,

obviously,

had an

al~,

seek

interest

in

proving its independence from Westcor and Badger in case there had been an,
The interest of Bitner Co. is clearly separat.

damage to Rogers or Bennett.

and distinct from the interests of Westcor, Monson and Badger.
Twice

in the course of the trial,

Davis moved for

a mistrial ac,

to require a new trial with separate counsel for the defendants represented b
him. (Tr. 500, 896)

Davis also moved orally under Rule 63 to have the tria,

judge recuse himself.

The trial court did not follow the procedures set forte

in Rule 63 and denied that motion at the same time it refused to grant th;
motion for a mistrial and new trial based on
clients.

the conflicts among Davis

(See Tr. 496-502; 895-97)
The clear conflicts among clients made

it

impossible for

Davis t:

defend any of them adequately and placed him in a severe and unjustifiabl;
ethical quandary.
counsel and

His

problem

was compounded by objections from

Bennett's counsel that Davis was

Rogers'

playing his clients off agains'

each other in presenting the defense and by comments from

the trial cour·

itself that Davis was walking a very thin line as far as procedure anc
propriety were concerned.

(See Tr. 361)

In Davis' testimony,
the defendants he represented.

he was asked to clarify the relationship amon:
The trial court asked questions,

taking him

beyond the direct questioning of Rogers' counsel so that Davis appears,
response to the
dants.

It

is

Court's questions,

clear from

to be testifying

part of his

testimony

Bitner Co. by testifying directly in its behalf.

in behalf of the defen

that he could have assister

(See Tr. 1123-25)

The Canons of Ethics adopted by this Court for the State of Utah,
Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule 5-102 states that:
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
I itigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer
in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his
client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his
-42-

ir

firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial,
except that he may continue the representation and he or a
lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated
in DR 5-lOl(B)(l) through (4).
(BJ If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
I itigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer
in his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of
his client, he may continue the representation until it is
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client.
The trial court,
equiring
situation

him
in

to

in not granting Davis' motion for a mistrial and in
to

continu~

which

represent

substantial

•estimony, Tr. 1123

those

several

injustice resulted

defendants created a

to Bitner Co.

(See Davis

~.)

Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 states that:
fC) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (BJ, a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can
adequate! y represent the interest of each and if each consents
to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
The language is conjunctive in this Rule.
1he

It must be obvious that

counsel can adequate! y represent both parties and the potential problems
be explained to all parties and their consent for mutual representation

~ust

be obtained.

In this case it was obvious that counsel could not represent all

defendants he purported

to

represent.

Opposing counsel said so,

and the trial

court itself said so.
Davis's conflicts were particularly harmful to Bitner Co.

The

•eccrci shows that Westcor was defenseless against the charges of both Rogers
ThPrefore,

while it was in the best interest of Bitner Co. that

" Joint venture be found between it and l'lestcor.
arry

all

financial

iiabilities.

I he same reason.
''J'ePment

declared

as it would be bound to

the case was exactly the opposite for Westcor

It was to Bitner Co.'s advantage to have the Trust
void

for

Westcor's
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failure

to

meet

its

terms

and

conditions.

It was Westcor's advantage to be held harmless under that

Agreement.

Most inequitable, Westcor was found directly liable for fraud ,,,

both Rogers and Bennett.
By

denying

the

Bitner Co.
motions

was found not guilty of any direct fraurl.

for

mistrial,

the

trial

court

allowed

the

conflict situation to persist and to cause gross injustice to Bitner Co.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61,
that a new trial be granted as a

this Court may determine

result of error of the trial court only ,,

the error is "inconsistent with substantial justice."

Bitner Co.'s not having

the advantage of representation by independent counsel did result in substantial injustice;

that injustice was permitted to develop into full flower b1

the findings and order of the court below.

An initial decision to engage the

same counsel cannot be permitted to persist to the point of prejudice,
especially when the problem was so prominent that counsel's testimony is even
inimical to the interest of one of his clients.

(See

Tr. 1106-15)

The trial court apparently denied the motions for mistrial and ne•
trial because of its concerns for judicial economy.

However,

the equities of

the situation make judicial economy secondary to reaching a just and equitable
solution among the parties.

As an alternative remedy, this Court should grant

Bitner Co. a new trial on any matters not resolved in its favor on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bitner Co.
be relieved from

liability as

liability be entered on
new trial.

respectfully requests that ,,

to Rogers and to Bennett and judgment of n,

its behalf.

In

the

alternative,

Bitner Co.

seeks "

It also requests such other and further relief as may be just a1"

proper.
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1ated.

Salt Lake City, Utah
March 14, 1984
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

ByWYrf~;f;~~ ~
M. Karlynn Hinman
David P. Farnsworth
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